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CULPABLE INTENT REQUIRED FOR ALL
CRIMINAL INSIDER TRADING .
CONVICTIONS AFTER UNITED STATES V.
O'HAGAN
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
O'Hagant has been widely recognized for its departure from the tradi-
tional theory .of insider trading liability and its validation of an alter-
native theory of liability that had previously been in question. 2 This
alternative theory is the "misappropriation" theory of insider trading,
which forbids a person from trading in securities while using confiden-
tial information gained in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source
of that information.' In O'Hagan, the Court upheld the convictions of
a lawyer who traded Pillsbury stock based on his "inside" knowledge
of a pending merger transaction involving Pillsbury, the target of a
tender offer, which he had obtained through his firm's representation
of the acquiring corporation. 4 With its validation of the misappropria-
tion theory, the Court expanded the federal government's enforce-
ment power under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") to impose criminal penalties on certain defendants who trade
securities based on material, nonpublic information.' This case. was,
therefore, called a "sweeping victory" by the Solicitor General of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") for its definitive rulings
regarding insider trading laws.°
In affirming the government's theory of liability, however, the
Court also interpreted the Exchange Act to mean that the government
must prove "culpable intent" on the part of insider trading defendants
in order to establish criminal liability for violations of the federal
1 521 U.S. 642 (1997).,
2 Sec id. at 659; Kimberly D. Krawiec et al., Don't Ash, just	 Insider Muting After United
States v. 01-lagait, 84 VA. L. Rix. 153, 155, 156 (1998); Carol A. Swaim'', Reinventing Insider
Trading: The Supreme Court Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1157, 1157 (1997).
3 See WHagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
4 See id. at 648.
See id. at 650.
See Paul Como'', Securities and Exchange Commission, Recent Judicial Developments, Apr,
16, 1998, SC88 A.L.1.-A.13.A. 1, 1 1.
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securities laws:7
 O'Hagan, therefore, was not actually such a sweeping
victory, because this standard of intent for criminal liability is more
strict than the standard utilized by the government in previous crimi-
nal insider trading cases!'
The Exchange Act requires that all criminal violations be commit-
ted "willfully."`' In the past, both the SEC and lower federal courts have
frequently interpreted the Exchange Act to mean that a willful viola-
tion of the securities laws occurs whenever a defendant voluntarily
undertakes an action that happens to he illegal.'° This type of "volun-
tary intent" was necessary to impose administrative sanctions or crimi-
nal penalties." In O'Hagan, however, the Court ruled that the term
"willful" in the Exchange Act means the defendant took a more pur-
poseful action, knowing •it violated the securities laws. 12 This subtle
distinction ensures that the government must prove actual culpable
intent on the part of an insider trading defendant in the traditional
sense required by criminal statutes that penalize "willful" violations.''
Although the SEC may still have a relatively easy time obtaining civil
injunctions or money damages against an insider trading defendant,
this ruling is a positive step because more drastic measures, such as
incarceration, are reserved for traders who willfully violate their known
legal duties." In the most egregious- cases, culpable intent can he
established without significant difficulty.''
7 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 665-66. The government also will have to prove this intent to
inipose administrative sanctions, such as suspensions, liars, etc., on individuals registered with the
SEC. See David Spews & James M; Aquilina, Ruling Limits SEC's Sanction Power; N.]'.L.J., Aug.
27, 1998, at I.
8 See United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2r1 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1972); Charles M. Carberry &
Harold K. Goalon,AflaO'llagan: Less Expansive Duties and Higher Mental States Restrict Criminal
Securities Laws Prosecutions, in SECOND ANNUAL FINANCIAL. SERVICES INSTITUTE 165, 172 (VIL
Corp. No. 1007, 1997).
15 U.S.C. § 781f(a) (1999).
1 ° See In re New Allied Dev. Corp., 52 S.E.C. 1119, 1129 ti.31 (1996); see also Schwartz, 464
F.2d at 509; Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C.
Cir. 1949).
" See New Allied Der. Carp., 52 S.E.C. at 1129, n.31; see also Schwartz, 464 F.2d at 509; Tam
344 F.2d at 8; Hughes, 174 F.2d at 977.
12 See ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
18 See : Bryan v. United States, —U.S. —, 118 S. Ct. 1939, .1945 (1998); Kawaauhau R Geiger,
— U.S. —, 118 S. Ct. 974, 977 (1998); Ratzlaf V. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994); United
States v. Yomponiu, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 303 U.S. 239,
242-43 (1938); United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1933); see also Carberry & Gordon,
supra note 8, at 179 (stating that "the conclusion that criminal Exchange Act liability under
32(a) requires at a minimum a stale of mind embracing an evil purpose comports with
well-settled principles of substantive criminal law.").
"See Spears & Aquilina, supra note 7, at 1.
15 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666; Spears & Aquilina, supra note 7, at 1.
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Part 1 of this Note sets out the applicable sections of the Exchange
Act and Rule 101)-5, which has developed into the primary enforce-
ment mechanism for all insider trading violations.'" Part 1 also explains
in brief detail the two general theories of proof the federal government
uses to establish liability on the part of defendants accused of illegal
insider trading of securities.'' Part It describes how the Exchange Act
originally required the government to establish a relatively high level
of scienter, or intent to deceive, by a defendant charged with criminal
violations of the federal securities laws." Several interpretations of this
standard, prior to the O'Hagan case, are then explored to show how
the original congressional intent has often been distorted. 19 Part II also
includes a brief discussion of several methods of proving scienter, or
willfulness.'" Part III of this Note examines the United States Supreme
Court's O'Hagan decision in detail and demonstrates how the Court's
statements regarding the intent of an insider trading criminal defen-
dant help illustrate the correct standard for a criminal comiction. 21
The O'Hagan decision on remand to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals provides one of the most recent judicial standards for will-
ful violations of the Exchange Act; Part III shows how that court,
although using some ambiguous language, reached the correct result
in affirming O'Hagami's comictions. 22 Part IV then analyzes the correct
standard of intent for criminal violations of the Exchange Act and
demonstrates how courts and the SEC should apply that standard in
the future."
I. INSIDER TRADING
A. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, entitled "Manipulative and
deceptive devices," most directly addresses the problem of fraudulent
securities trading. 2" Section 10(b) provides, in pertinent part:
16 See infra !totes 24-34 u l accompaming text.
17 See infra 'toles 35-52 and ;WC outs tanyillg text.
18 See infra !toles 53-64 and accontitaziying text.
19 See infra !lutes 65-110 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 111-52 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 153-95 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 196-203 mid accompaming text.
23 See infra notes 204-73 and accompanying text.
" Srr. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1999).
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national secu-
rities exchange . (b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."
On its face, § 10(b) does not actually make any activity illegal; it
merely provides the SEC with rulemaking authority to outlaw cer-
tain conduct:26
 Pursuant to this statutory grant of authority, the SEC
adopted Rule 10b-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national secu-
rities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, . . . [or] (c) To engage in any .act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 27
Once a person charged with manipulation or deception in con-
nection with either the purchase or sale of securities is found liable,
that person becomes subject to civil penalties, criminal penalties and/
or administrative sanctions. 28
 Criminal liability is covered by § 32(a), •
which states:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter
. . . or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of
which is made unlawful or the observance of which is re-
quired under the terms of this chapter ... shall upon convic-
tion be fined not more than $1,000,000, or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both . ... but no person shall be subject
to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any
25 Id.
26 See id.; see also Steve Thel, The Original Conreption.of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Art, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 464 11.10 (1990).
27 17 C.F.R. § 240.101)-5 (1999).
28 See IS U.S.C. §§ 78n-I (a) (1) (A), 78IT(a), 780(b) (4)(D) (1999),
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rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of
such rule or regulation. 2°
When the SEC suspects someone of criminal violations under
§ 32(a), it has discretion to prepare a formal referral to the Depart-
ment of Justice." The SEC may bring civil and administrative proceed-
ings to investigate potential violations, but the Department of Justice,
has sole jurisdiction to institute criminal proceedings under the Ex-
change Act.'" Administrative sanctions are available under § 15 (b) (4)
against securities brokers, dealers and others working within the secu-
rities industry, who are officially registered with the SEC. t 2 The Ex-
change Act also grants the SEC power to levy civil penalties against any
§ 10(b) violator." Congress, however, , purposefully omitted the term
"willfully" in the section authorizing civil penalties, whereas criminal
liability and the imposition of administrative sanctions against regis-
tered persons require a defendant to have willfully violated the relevant
sections of the Exchange Act. 34
B. Two General Theories of Liability
There are two distinct general theories of insider trading liability
that are used to establish a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 1013-.5. 35 These
29 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
10 See 15 U.S.C. § 78(101)(1) (1999): Jennifer D. Antolini et al., Semilies Fraud, 34 Att. Cant.
L. Iticv. 983, 1029 (1997).
31 See 17	 §. 202.5(f) (1999).
52 Srs 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(1)) (1999). Exchange Act § 15(b) (4) (D) ptuvides that: "The
Cominission, by order, shall censure, plac:e lin:nations on the activities, functions, or operations
of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registration of any broker
or dealer if it. finds, Olt the record after notice and ... a hearing, that such censure, placing of
lit litatiuus, suspetisiot is, or revocation is in the public interest and that such broker or dealer .. .
has willfully violated any provision of ... this title [Exchange Act)." Id.
"See IS U.S.C. § 7811-1(a)(1)(A) (1999). The Exchange Act provides that:
whenever it shall appeal 10 the COMIlliSS1011 that any 1/C1'MM has violated any
provision of this chapter tui the rules or regulations thereu nder by purchasing or
selling a security while it: possession of material, no information, or has
violated ally such provision by commulticating such information in connection with,
a Itansaction on or through the facilities of a national securities exchange , the
Commission (A) may britig an action in a United States district court to seek ... a
civil penalty to be [mid by the person who conunitted such viohnion,
Id.
54 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n-1(a) (1) (A), 7811'(a), 780(10(4) (D) (1999).
55 See U nitcti States v. O'Ilagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997); Carl:enter v. United Stoics, 484
U.S. 19. 24 (1987); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 566 (2t1 Cir. 1991) (en bane); Paul
H. Dawes, The Mans Requirement for Criminal : Liability Under &Trion 10(b) and Rule I0b-5, in
SECOND ANNUAL. FINANCIAL SEUVICES INSTITUTE 515, 521-22 (PL1 Corp. No. 1070, 1998).
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are the "traditional" (or "classical") theory and the "misappropriation"
theory of insider trading liability."`' Under the traditional theory, a
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5 occurs when a corporate insider
purchases or sells the securities of his or her corporation on the basis
of material, nonpublic information." This conduct is illegal because
the fiduciary relationship of trust and confidence between sharehold-
ers of a corporation and those corporate insiders who have obtained
confidential information creates a duty to disclose or abstain from
trading because of the "necessity of preventing a corporate insider
from . . . taking unfair advantage of uninformed . . . stockholders. ""a
This theory applies not only to corporate officers, directors, employees
and other "permanent insiders," but also to attorneys, accountants and
other temporary insiders of a corporation.sg A temporary insider is
someone who receives material, confidential information while per-
forming legitimate services for a corporation and, therefore, develops
a fiduciary relationship with that corporation. 4°
Under the misappropriation theory, a corporate "outsider" vio-
lates § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5 when that person trades in securities using
material, confidential information without disclosing such use to the
source of information, in breach of a fiduciary duty, or duty of trust
and confidence, owed to that source.' [ Liability, therefore, is not based
on a fiduciary relationship between the trader and a purchaser or seller
of a company's s. tock.42 Instead, the trader is a corporate "outsider" who
owes a duty to the source of the nonpublic information to either
disclose an intent to trade on the information or abstain from trading
on it altogether. 43
These two theories of insider trading liability, traditional and mis-
appropriation, are often considered complementary:" The traditional
° See 0 flagon, 521 U.S. at 051-52. Along with these two theories, SEC Rule !4e-3 specifically
Imbids trading on material, nonpublic information in the context of a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14e-3(a) (1999). In order to violate Rule 14e-3, a trader must be aware that he or she is
using information that is nonpublic and has been provided by a corporate insider. See id.
37 See °Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-20 (citation omitted).
39 See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646.655 11.14 (1983).
40 See id. For such a duty to be imposed. however, the cot -potation most expect the outsider
to keep the disclosed nonpublic informatimi confidential, and the relationship at least must imply
such a duty."
41 See °flagon, 521 U.S. at 652.
42 See id. at 653.
43 See id. at 652.
44 See id. Some commentators: however, have stressed that the misappropriation theory
actually targets any insider trading activity that could conceivably be covered by the traditional
theory. See Barbara Bader Ahlave, Misappropriation: A General Many of Liability for Rafting on
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theory targets a corporate insider's breach of duty to shareholders with
whom the insider trades." The misappropriation theory targets trading
on the basis of nonpublic information by a corporate "outsider" in
breach of a duty owed not to the trading party, but to the source of
the inforniation.4" The misappropriation theory, therefore, "protectrs]
the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to
a corporation who have access to confidential information that will
affect the corporation's security price when revealed, but who owe no
fiduciary or other duty to that corporation's shareholders." 47 The the-
ory's goal is to promote investor confidence in honest securities mar-
kets: "Although informational disparity is inevitable in the securities
markets, investors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic informa-
tion is unchecked by law. "}s
The validity of the misappropriation theory for criminal liability
remained in question until the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan.4 •)
Prior to that case, the Court had only twice been presented with the
question of whether criminal liability for a violation of § 10(b) may he
based on the misappropriation theory. 5° In 1980, a majority of the
Court in Chiarella v. United States explicitly declined to address the
question because the theory had not been submitted to the jury at
tria1.•' In a 1987 decision, Caipenter v. United States, the Court split
evenly (4-4) on whether convictions resting on the misappropriation
theory should be affirmed. 52
Nonpublic Information, 13 liorsTRA L. REV. 101, 102 (1984). Instead of the Iwo theories being
complementary, thererore, there is actually no real need fur the traditional theory or insider
trading liability at all. See id.
45 See O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
46 See id. at 052-53.
"17 Id. at 653 (citation omitted).
48 Id. at 658; me Victor Brildney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantagrs Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 Kum L. REV. 322, 356 (1979).
See generally O'llagan v. United States, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996) Hunt:in:door 0 7-lagivi
111; United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3t1 933 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Chestman, 047 F,2d 551
(2d Cir, 1991) (en bane); SEC v, Cheri•, 033 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991),
5° See Carpirter v. United States, 484 U.S. 10, 24 (1987); Chiarella v, United Slates, 445 U.S.
222, 235-37 (1980).
Sre ChiarrIla, 445 U.S. at 236-37. Writing in dissent, however, Chief justice Burger approved
or the misappropriation theory to sustain the petitioner's convictions. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240
(Burger, Cj., dissenting).
52 See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
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IL "WILLFUL" VIOLATIONS OF § 10(B) AND RULE 1013-5
A. Legislative History of § 32(a)
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1997 O'Hagan decision, the stand-
ard for criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction under § 32(a)
was not always consistent with Congress's original intent when it passed
the Exchange Act.n When the Exchange Act was first enacted in 1934,
one influential commentator, William B. Herlands (later elevated to
the federal bench in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York), described Congress's motives in adding the term
"willfully violate" to the criminal penalties section:
The express requirement of "willfulness" in Section 32 and
the seriousness of the possible penalty thereunder warrant
the belief that "guilty intent" will be required for prosecutions
under this statute. The word "willfully" in the ordinary sense
in which it is used in penal statutes means "not merely volun-
tary but with a bad purpose." And such was the definition
which the Congressional Committees intended the word to
have in the [Exchange Act].''
Herlands also stated that "[w] here violations are not committed
'willfully,' the Securities Exchange Commission . . . may neverthe-
less institute administrative, injunction, or mandamus proceedings.
Aggrieved purchasers may commence civil actions. And the Stock
Exchange itself must take action against its delinquent members.'"
Herlands noted that criminal proceedings, however, are "set into
motion by 'willful' violations."5" Additional evidence of congres-
sional intent on the subject of criminal liability is found in Senate
hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency in March
of 1934.57
 Ferdinand Pecora, appointed by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, as chief counsel to the Committee, stated repeatedly that
53 See Norwood P. Beveridge, Is Aliens Rea Required for a Criminal Violation of the Federal
Securities Laws?, 52 BUS. LAW. 35, 47-48 (1996); Jonathan Eisenberg, "Willful" Violations of the
Federal Securities Laws: Wley the SEC's No-Fault Approach is Now Ripe for Rejection, 5 Inuncarts 13,
13 (1991); Spears & Aduiliva, .supra note 7, at 1.
54 4Villi.nu B. IlerlaUCls, C'rieninal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA. L.
REV. 139, 147-48 (1934).
55 M. at 144.
56
 Id. at 145.
57
 See Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 C..e S. Res. 97 &fore the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong. 6965-69, 7455-66, 7572-74, 7623-24 (1934) [here-
inafter 1934 Ilearings1; Beveridge, supra note 53, at 46; Carberry & Gordon, supra nine 8. at 179.
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the Exchange Act was not intended to punish innocent violators."
During the hearings, Howard Butcher, Jr., President of the Philadel-
phia Stock Exchange, expressed concerns about the lack of differ-
ence in penalties (civil and criminal) between innocent violators of
the Act and "willful" violators. Pecora responded:
Mr. Pecora: [If] you are fearful that directors may be sent
to jail for unwitting violations ... [§ 32] specifically says: "Any
person who willfully violates any provision of this act or any
rule . . . [is] subject to the penalties prescribed in the bill."
That is something far different from an unwitting or innocent
violation, isn't it?
Mr. Butcher: That is what the language appears to say, but—
Mr. Pecora: Oh, no. It is not a technicality at all, It is a very
substantial provision, and it is intended to mean just what it
says. There is a great difference between a willful violation of
a penal statute and an innocent violation of it. Yes; there is
all the difference in the world between the two. 59
In his interpretation of the language and history behind § 32(a),
Herlancls also contrasted one's actual knowledge of a specific rule or
regulation, with a general knowledge of wrongdoing; "[T]he defen-
dant need not be shown to have had knowledge of the particular
statute or rule which he violated, provided the prosecution establishes
a realization on the defendant's part that he was doing a. wrongful act." 6°
This distinction is extremely important when looking at the potential
punishment imposed under § 32(a), because a defendant can escape
imprisonment if he or she did not have knowledge of the rule or
regulation allegedly violated. 61 Therefore, a person can be criminally
convicted of a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation, if that person acted
with the realization that he or she was committing a wrongful act, but
may avoid a jail sentence if he or she can prove a lack of specific
knowledge as to § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5. 62
Several Commentators have also pointed out that the Exchange
Act was passed into law on the heels of a recent United States Supreme
Court decision that clearly explained what the term "willfully" actually
r'8 See 1934 Hearings, supra note 57 at 6966-67, 7465; Beveridge, supra note 53, at 46;
Carberry Conlon, supra note 8, at 179.
69 1934 hearings, supra note 57, at 7465; see also Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 179;
lierltu ids, supra note 54, at 148.
Flerlantls. supra 11(11(! 54, at 149 (emphasis added).
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1999); flerlands, supra 'Jute 54, at 149.
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 781f (a) (1999); Herlaticls, supra note 54, at 149.
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means hi a criminal statute.° In United States v. Murdock, decided in
1933, just a few months prior to Congress's use of the term "willfully"
in § 32(a) of the Exchange Act, the Court held that when the word
"willful" is used in a penal statute, it means that an act is done with a
"bad purpose" or "evil intent," not merely an act which is voluntarily
undertaken by a defendant. 64
B. Interpretations of § 32(a) After 1934
Almost immediately after the Exchange Act was passed, however,
the SEC began to erode the distinction between willful and non-willful
violations of § 10(b),° Until O'Hagan in 1997, the federal government
consistently took the position that a person was criminally liable for
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations if that person intentionally or volun-
tarily engaged in acts that were prohibited by that section. 66 The test
was not whether an individual knew that his or her actions violated the
Exchange Act, but merely whether or not that individual had acted
voluntarily and without coercion.° The SEC, therefore, transformed
all violations in criminal and administrative proceedings into willful
violations: a person "willfully violates" the securities laws as long as that
person is merely "aware of all that [he or she] is doing," without any
regard to whether that person is aware that the particular action is
against the law." This approach led one commentator, Jonathan Eis-
enberg, to describe the SEC as an organization that simply holds . a
person liable for willful violations of the Exchange Act as long as that
person was not "insane, unconscious, or sleepwalking" at the time of
the conduct in question.°
This policy regarding "voluntary intent" was evident in several SEC
administrative decisions and in judicial cases involving the criminal
aspects of insider trading of securities. 70 For example, in a 1940 admin-
61 See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 394 (1033); Ileverklge, supra note 53, at 47;
Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.
6-1 See Murdock, '290 U.S. at 394,
°:,
	 United States v. Cbarnay, 537'.E2E1 341, 357 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schwartz,
464 F.2d 499, 509 (2E1 Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2(1 5, 8
(2d Cir. 1965); Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2E1 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1949); In reThompson Ross Sec., 6
S.E.C. 1111, 1122-23 (1940); Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.
66 See Clammy. 537 F.2(1 at 357; Schwartz, 464 F.2d at 509; 7hgrr, 344 F.2d at 8; Mews, 174
F.2d at 977; Thompson Ross Sec., 6 S.E.C. at 1122-23.
67 See Charnay, 537 E2(1 at 357 (Sneed, J., concurring); Schwartz, 404 F.2d at 509; Tager, 344
F.2(1 at 8; Hughes, 174 F.2(1 at 977; Thompson Ross Sec., 6 S.E.C. at 1122-23.
66 See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.
69
 id. at 17.
7° See Charnay, 537 F.2d at 357; Schwartz, 464 F.2d at 509; Tiger; 344 F.2(1 at 8; Hughes, 174
F.2d at 977; Thompson Ross Sec., 6 S.E.C. at 1122-23.
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istrative hearing before the SEC, In re Thompson Ross Securities, the SEC
considered the meaning of "willfully violates" in the Exchange Act for
the first time.7 ' This action arose in the context of a proceeding initi-
ated pursuant to § 15(b) which provides for administrative sanctions
against a defendant upon proof of willful violations of the Exchange
Act. 72 Thompson Ross Securities was charged with selling unregistered
securities. 73 Upon finding that the firm, in fact, acted illegally, the SEC
considered a defense raised by Thompson Ross that it had not acted
"willfully," as required by the statute, because the firm relied on the
advice of counsel and acted hi good faith. 74 The SEC rejected this
defense and held that the firm acted willfully because "[it] was fully
aware of all that it was doing."75 The SEC reasoned that it was enough
that Thompson Ross had voluntarily undertaken to sell the securities
in question, even though the firm did so with the belief that it was in
full compliance with the applicable laws. 76 One of the Commissioners
dissented from this ruling and stated that "since the company acted
upon advice from counsel on a matter that was not entirely free from
doubt, I doubt whether the violation was willful . . . . "77
This broad standard of "voluntary intent" was validated by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1965, in Tager v. SEC. 18
There, the court upheld the revocation of the registration of a securi-
ties broker-dealer (Tager), as provided in § 15(b), stating that the term
"willfully" in the Exchange Act means simply "intentionally committing
the act which constitutes the violation." 79 The SEC charged the appel-
lant broker-dealer with unlawfully giving a false appearance of market
activity in a corporation's stock that he was underwriting. 80 Tager had
inserted false quotations into sheets published by the National Quota-
tions Bureau ("NQB"), which gave investors an impression that the
stock was trading more often than its actual volume indicated. 8 '
Tager argued that to show willful violations of the Exchange Act,
the SEC would have to establish that he had an understanding that his
71 Sm 6 S.E.C. at 1122-23.
72 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b); Thompson Ross See., 6 S.E.C. at 1112.
"See Thompson Ross Sec., 6 S.E.C. at 1112.
74 See id. at 1122.
"Id. at 1123.
76 SO' id,
"Id. at 1123-24 (Healy, C., dissenting).
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 780(1)(4)(D); Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cit .. 1965).
Tagil; 344 F.2d at 8, 9.
"See id. at 8.
81 See id. at 7.
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activities were manipulative.82
 The Second Circuit's Chief Judge Lum-
bard, however, dismissed this claim as "wholly lacking in merit," and
ruled that an individual acts willfully if he intentionally or voluntarily
undertakes an act constituting a securities law violation." In other
words, the court took the position that there is no requirement that
the defendant also be aware that his or her conduct violates a provision
of the Exchange Act or SEC Rule. 84
The SEC's position that "voluntary" intent equals "willful" intent
to violate the Exchange Act, however, was undermined by case law
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in O'Hagan. 85 The most influen-
tial decisions involving § 32(a) of the Act were written in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit by Judge Henry Frienclly. 8
 Judge
Friendly repeatedly supported the notion that in order for an individ-
ual to be held criminally liable for violating the Exchange Act, it is
necessary to prove that the individual acted not merely voluntarily, but
with a bad purposes' Judge Friendly explicitly relied on Judge Her-
lands' ideas about the term "willfully" in the criminal context of the
Act, and was in fact a New -York neighbor of Judge Herlands in the
1960s.88
Judge Friendly clearly expressed his ideas regarding criminal in-
tent in United States v. Dixon, a 1976 Second Circuit. decision, which
involved the criminal conviction of a defendant for violating § 14(a)
of the Exchange Act by filing a false proxy statement and annual
report.89
 The defendant, Dixon, was president of a New York corpora-
tion that manufactured voting machines. 99
 Dixon was convicted at trial
for violations of § 14(a) for "willfully and unlawfully devising a scheme
or artifice to defraud" his corporation's stockholders by making false
entries in the corporate books. 91 Dixon defended on the grounds that
lie believed that he had honestly fulfilled the legal requirements both
82 See id. at 8.
83 See id,
8-4 See Thgei; 344 F.2d at 8; see also Schwartz, 469 F.2d at 508 (holding that proof of a specific
intent lo violate the law is not necessary to uphold a coiniction under 32(a) of die Exchange
Act, provided that "satisfactory proof is established that a defendant intended to commit the act
prohibited"); Carberry & Gordon, st(pm note 8, at 173-74.
85 See United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1396 (2d Cir. 1976); United Slates v. Paz, 433
F.2d 48. 55 (2c1 Cir. 1070); United States v. Cinema, 281 F.2d 742, 753 (2d Cir. 1060).
86 See generally Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388; Peitz, 433 F.2d 48; Gaterina, 281 F.2d 742.
87 See Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1396; Peitz, 433 F.2d at 55; Guternui, 281 F.2d at 753.
88 See Beveridge, supra note 53, at 64 1[.146.
89 See 536 F.2d at 1391.
9{F See id.
91 See id. at 1392.
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for filing proxy statements and for his calculations in the corporate
books."
Writing for the Second Circuit's majority, Judge Friendly affirmed
these criminal convictions under § 32(a) of the Exchange Act because
Dixon had willfully violated the securities laws." The court held that a
"willful" act under § 32(a) is one that is clone intentionally, deliberately
and not the result of innocent mistake." Judge Friendly stated that
although a specific intent to disregard or disobey a law is not required,
the defendant must he shown to have had some evil purpose, or mucus►
rea.95 He went further to rule that in a criminal conviction for violations
of any section of the Exchange Act, or any rule promulgated thereu ►-
der, the prosecution must establish "a realization on the defendant's
part that he was doing a wrongful act under the securities laws and
that such an act involved a significant risk of effecting the violation
that occurred.""
A 1976 decision by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, United
States v. Charnay, clearly illustrates the difficulties that courts face in
applying the appropriate standard of criminal intent in securities law
cases.•" Charnay involved criminal indictments brought against Howard
Hughes and several of his associates in their capacity as managers and
directors of Hughes Tool Company ("Hughes Tool")." The defendants
made an offer to acquire the assets of Air West, a corporation whose
stock traded on the American Stock Exchange ("AMEX")."" After a
majority of Air West directors voted to reject the Hughes offer, the
defendants threatened to depress the price of Air West stock on the
AMEX, by having Charnay, a private Air West stockholder, sell his large
block of Air West sharesim This threat was carried out, and Air West
stock dropped from $18 per share to $15.75 per share in one day of
trading activity.'w The Air West directors then apparently changed their
minds and accepted the offer to sell Air West's assets to Hughes Tool.'"
92 See id. at 1395.
as See id. at 1396, 1402.
9' See Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1397.
95 See id.
96 See id. at 1395; see also Jed S. Rakolf, "Willful" Intent in ()halm?! Securities Cases, N.Y.L.J.,
May 11, 1995, at 3 (stating that "Ili other words. what was required lin Dixon) was classic criminal
mens rea, no IllOYC and no less.").
`' 7 See generally 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1976).




tos See Charnay, 537 E2d at 344.
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The defendants were subsequently charged with criminal violations of
§ 10(b)of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 for artificially manipulat-
ing the market price of a seem*"
The Ninth Circuit held that the indictment in Charnay was suf-
ficient to allege a criminal offense and rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege
any specific intent to defraucl.K" Relying heavily on Judge Friendly's
prior rulings regarding the meaning of the term "willfully violate" in
the Exchange Act, the majority held that the prosecution had met its
burden of establishing that the defendants knowingly participated in
an act that they realized was Wrongful. 1°5 The court also held that
knowledge of the specific section or rule was not necessary.' 0° The
indictment, therefore, sufficiently alleged "willful" violations of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-52°7
One Circuit judge concurring in Charnay, however, wrote that the
indictment was valid because, under § 32(a), the intent necessary to
support a conviction is merely that of intending to do the acts prohib-
ited, rather than intent to violate the statute.'" In stark contrast to the
court's majority, this concurring opinion stated that "[p] roof of an 'evil
motive' appears unnecessary" to support a conviction under § 32(a)."
The concurrence further stated that no degree of scienter or mens rea
is part of a criminal violation of the Exchange Act."°
C. "Willfulness" in General
1. Aaron v. SEC Defines Scienter as an Element of a
§ 10(h) Violation
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court, in Aaron v. SEC, made
definitive statements regarding scienter as an element of a § 10(b) and
Rule 101)-5 violation)" Aaron involved an employee of a broker-dealer
firm who was accused both of violating and aiding and abetting viola-
I" See id.
"See id. at 351.
1 °5 8ee id. at 351-52.
Sre id. at 352.
107 See Charnay, 537 F.2(.1 at 352.
100 See id. at 357 (Sneed, J., concurring); Bryan S. Schultz, Note, Feigning Fidelity to .Seelion
10(b): Insider Trading Liability After United States v. al•agati, 06 U. C. L. REv. 1411, 1442
(1998).
L OS See Charnay, 537 F.24 al 357 (Sneed, J., concurring),
110
 See id.
III See 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980).
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Lions of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, in connection with his firm's cam-
paign for certain securities." 2 Specifically, the employee was accused of
failing to prevent other employees under his control from making false
and misleading statements to potential investors regarding a certain
stock for sale even though he kneW of this deceptive practice." 3 The
SEC sued this employee for injunctive relief and succeeded at both the
trial and appellate levels, without proving that the defendant actually
intended to violate the securities laws.'' 4
The United States Supreme Court vacated the order for an injunc-
tion against the defendant and held that scienter is a necessary ele-
ment of a § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5 violation, regardless of the plaintiffs
identity or of the nature of the relief sought." 5 The Court defined
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."' 16 It ruled that anyone seeking to prove a violation of § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5 must establish this mental state on the part of the
defendant at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct. 117justice Black-
mun filed a dissenting opinion in Aaron, partly because Congress
specifically omitted the word "willfully" from the statutory provision
authorizing the SEC to sue for an injunction. 1 t 8 Blackmun reasoned
that when Congress wished to impose a state-of-mind requirement,
terms such as "willfully" .were used in the Exchange Act.'"
2. Proof of Willfulness
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron arose in a civil
context,' 2° it is .generally recognized that there is no functional differ-
ence between the requirement of scienter in civil cases and the require-
inent of willfulness in criminal cases.' 2 ' Courts often use both of these
terms when referring to the required mental state of criminal defen-
112 See id. at 684.
"5 See id. at 683.
IN See id. at 683-84.
115 See id. at 691, 702.
116 See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 686 n.5.
"'See id. at 691.
118 See id. at 713-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
II" See id.
12" See id. at 682.
121 SecAntolini et al., supra note 30, at 993 (stating that although civil actions require scienter
and criminal actions require Ivillfulites, it is unclear whether this semantic distinction has any
practical significance); Carol IV Silver, Penalizing Insider Trading: A °Meal Assessment of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 1985 DUKE L.J. 960, 1021 (1985) (arguing that, "courts
have interpreted the term as used in § 32, to mean that only ordinary scienter is
necessary to support a criminal conviction.").
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dants being prosecuted under the federal securities laws.' 22 Courts also
frequently recognize that scienter, or willfulness, is a difficult concept
to define and prove.'" In order to understand how the element of
willfulness is established in a criminal trial under the Exchange Act, it
is necessary to explore briefly the allocation of the burden of proof
and some factors that tend to show willfulness on the part of a defen-
dant.
In all criminal insider trading cases, the government bears the
initial burden of proving that a particular defendant (or group of
defendants) willfully violated § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5.' 24 The govern-
ment must prove this violation to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable.
doubt. 12' Several courts and commentators have recognized that will-
fulness can rarely be shown by direct evidence because it is a state of
mind.' 26 Rather, willfulness is usually established by drawing reasonable
inferences from all of the available circumstantial facts.' 27
In order to satisfy its burden, the government can rely on several
factors that tend to indicate a defendant's intent to deceive. 128 Al-
though a defendant's actual knowledge of a particular section of the
Exchange Act or SEC Rule is not necessary for a criminal conviction,' 29
such knowledge does provide sufficient evidence to infer a willful
violation. 13° Actual knowledge of the illegality of one's activity can be
shown by proof that, at some point prior to an allegedly illegal trade,
an individual received actual notice of the applicable law or regulation
that was violated."' This method of proof can be effective in prosecu-
122 See United States v. O'llagati, 521 U.S. 642, 665 (1097); Antolini et al., supra note 30, at
993; Silver, supra note 121, at 1021.
123 See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 393 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Gurfein, •., concurring) ("I do not think a litmus paper test of sciei tier will ever be found."); id.
at 397 (Mansfield, J., concurring and dissenting) (slating that: "Scienter, like obscenity, [is]
simply ... something recognized when seen, but not otherwise definable" in Rule 101)-5 cases).
124 See Antolini el al., supra note 30, at 1019.
125 See United Stales v. Swink, 21 F,3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1994); United Stales v. Benjamin,
328 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1964).
126 See United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir, 1085); Robert F. Koets, 	 Constitutes
"Wilifulness" for Purposes of Criminal Provisions of Federal Securities Laws, 136 A.L.R. FED. 457, 466
(1997).
127 See Hills, 766 F.2d at 20; Tarvestad v. United States, 418 F.2d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1969)
(holding that knowledge and willfulness of a defendant need not be proved by direct evidence,
but may be established by circumstantial evidence); Gates v. United States, 122 F.2t1 571, 575 (10th
Cir. 1941); Koets, supra note 126, at 466.
128 See Swink, 21 F.3d at 855 (holding that the determination of whether a defendant, charged
with violating § 32 of the Exchange Act, knew that his conduct was illegal should be based on
the totality of the circumstances).
129 See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
13° See Spears & Aquilina, supra note 7, at 1.
131 See id.; Carberry & Gordon; supra note 8, at 184.
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dons of individuals with experience in the securities industry, but is
not likely to apply to those with no such experience.'" In the insider
trading context, market professionals are generally governed by their
employer's written policies and procedures on trading and using ma-
terial, nonpublic information. 1 " Therefore, actual knowledge can be
proven using these policies and procedures, and any violations will
provide evidence Of willfulness or. culpable intent.'" A general lack of
knowledge of securities laws prohibitions, however, is a viable argument
against prosecuting non-market professionals who have no actual no-
tice of what activities are illegal.'''
The government may also use the common trading practices of a
particular defendant's occupation or industry as evidence of that de-
fendant's willful violations.' 't' If the prosecution can show that a defen-
dant's trading activity is recognized within the industry as a violation
of the federal securities laws, a trier of fact may consider as evidence
that the defendant knew or should have known the activity was ille-
gal.'"7 Conversely, if the defendant traded in a manner that is common
among others within his or her field, this may demonstrate a lack of
culpable intent.' 38
Additionally, to demonstrate willfulness on the part of an insider
trading defendant, the government can rely on certain customary
indicia of guilty knowledge in criminal cases.'" 9 The indicia include
deceit or misrepresentation in connection with the allegedly unlawful
conduct, a defendant's efforts at concealment and false exculpatory
statements made to explain . prior conduct.'"
If the government succeeds in upholding its burden to prove that
a defendant willfully violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the defendant
Can still raise several affirmative defenses. 141 For example, defendants
accused of securities fraud typically raise the defense of "good faith,"
or the absence of an intent to defraud, to rebut a showing of willful-
1311 See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 184.
1 "See id.
1 3 1 See id.
1311 See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1978); United Stales v. Minuse,
114 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1940): William E. Aiken, Ji;, Element qf &imam. as Affecting Criminal
Prosecutions for Violation of Federal Securities Law, 20 A.L.R. FED, 227, 236, 265 (1974).
137 54TAiken, supra now 136, at 236, 265.
1118 See id.
139
	 Spears &	 supra note 7, at I.
110 See id.
141 See Antolini et al. ; supra note 30, at 1019.
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ness: 42 Because a willful violation cannot be "the result of innocent
mistake, negligence or inadvertence,"' 43 defendants may claim that
they believed they were conforming with the federal securities laws: 44
The trier of fact will -weigh any evidence presented by the defendant
and the prosecution to determine whether the defendant did, in fact,
act in good faith: 49
A closely related defense to "good faith" is a defendant's reliance
on the advice of an expert: 48 Reliance on expert advice prior to alleg-
edly illegal conduct, such as advice of counsel or of an expert account-
ant, is not a complete defense, but such demonstrated reliance can
rebut a showing of criminal intent and willfulness: 47 In order to claim
this defense a person must have honestly and in good faith sought the
advice of counsel, or other expert, fully disclosed all relevant facts to
the expert, received assurance from the expert that the proposed
activity was legal, and relied in good faith on the advice. 148 This defense
is not available, however, if the expert was an interested party to the
proposed activity, or if the defendant knowingly withheld facts from
the expert that would have indicated the illegal nature of the activity: 49
Additionally, an insider trading defendant may always claim an ab-
solute defense to imprisonment for any criminal violations of § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5: 99 As previously noted, § 32(a) of the Exchange Act
mandates that "no person shall he subject to imprisonment under this
section for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he
had no knowledge of such rule or regulation."''' This clause of § 32 is
particularly useful to non-market professionals, who may not have
difficulty showing a lack of knowledge of an SEC rule or regulation,
14.2 See id. at 1021.
143
 United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1396 (2d Cir. 1976) (approving jury instruction
regarding willfulness in the district court).
144 See Allt0ii/li et al., supra note 30, at 1020,
145 See Weiner, 578 F.2d at 786, 787 (holding that for defendants charged with violating § 32
of the Exchange Act, proof of good faith constitutes a complete defense to the charges); Antolini
et al., supra note 30, at 1021.
146 See Aiken, supra note 136, at 266; Antolini et al., supra note 30, at 1021.
147 See United States V. United hied, & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1403 (4th Cir.
1993) (holding good faith reliance on counsel is only one factor for a jury to consider when it
determines the defendant's intent and is not a complete defense to willful misconduct); Aiken,
supra note 136, at 266; Antolini et al., supra note 30, at 1021.
1-18 See Antolini et al., supra note 30, at 1022; see also Aiken, supra note 136, at 267.
149 SeeArtIntr Lipper Corp, v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 181-82 (2d Cir. 1976); Antolini et al., supra
note 30, at 1022.
15° See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1990).
151 Id.
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especially in situations where no attempt to conceal the trading activity
or other evidence of a wrongful purpose is present.' 52
HI. THE °HAGAN CASE
A. The Supreme Court's Ruling in United States v. O'Hagan
The United States Supreme Court's 1997 decision in United States
v. 07-lagan further defined the boundaries of the federal government's
enforcement power under the Exchange Act in cases involving the
trading of securities based on material, nonpublic information)" This
case also clarified the standard of criminal intent ne cessary to sustain
a conviction under § 32(a) of the Exchange Act,' 54 The Court, in a
majority opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, held that criminal
liability under § 10(b) of the Exchange Act may be predicated on the
misappropriation theory of liability.'" Iii doing so, the Court resolved
a division between several federal courts of appeal)"
This case began with a potential tender offer for the common
stock of Pillsbury Co., a Minneapolis, Minnesota-based corporation. 157
In July 1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC ("Grand Met"), a London-based
company, hired a Minneapolis law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, as local
counsel, to represent Grand Met in the prospective transaction.' 58 James
O'Hagan was a senior litigation partner in Dorsey & Whitney, special-
izing in medical Malpractice and securities law cases. 15" At no time,
however, did O'Hagan perform any work on the Grand Met repre-
sentation.m On September 9, 1988, Dorsey & Whitney withdrew from
representing Grand Met, and abOut one month later Grand Met pub-
licly announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock."
While Dorsey & Whitney was still representing Grand Met, how-
ever, O'Hagan began to purchase call options for Pillsbury stock.' 62
152 See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 187-88.
153 See 521 U.S. al 650.
154 see id. at 665-66.
155 5're id. at 650.
156 See O'llflgan IL 92 F.3d at 612; United States v. liryut, 58 F.3d 933, 943-59 (4111 Gilt -, 1995);
United States v. Chesnut -In, 947 F.2d at 551, 506 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410
(7th Cir. 1991).
157 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 647.
158 See id.
See id.; Bt'ief for the United States, 1997 1YL 80306 at *2. Oltagan (No. 90-842).
16° .See ()Hagan, 52! U.S. at 047.
161 See
162 See id. A "call option" is it contract between the seller of an option and the purchaser of
that option (option holder), under which the put chaser buys the right to have the u nderlying
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Each option gave him a right to buy 100 shares of the stock by a
specified date in September 1988." By the end •of September, O'Ha-
gan owned 2,500 Pillsbury call options, more than any other individual
investor.'' He . also bought 5,000 shares of Pillsbury common stock in
September, at a price of $39 per share.''' Iii October; when Grand Met
announced its tender offer, the price of Pillsbury stock soared to almost
$60 per share.' 66 0'Hagan then sold all of his call options and common
stock, and made a profit of more than $4.3 million.' 67 According to the
subseqUent indictment against him, however, O'Hagan actually had to
put the profits from this trading into his law firm's trust account,
because he had previously embezzled an unrelated client's trust funds
that were under his exclusive care."
The SEC began an investigation into O'Hagan's trading activity
after he sold the Pillsbury stock, leading to a fifty-seven count indict-
ment charging O'Hagan with, among other crimes, securities fraud in
violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.'e 9 Because O'Hagan was not an
"insider" of Pillsbury and, therefore, owed that company no fiduciary
duties, the government needed to proceed with a claim based on the
misappropriation theory of liability.' 7" Specifically, the indictment al-
leged that O'Hagan had breached a duty of trust and confidence he
owed to his firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, by
trading on the basis of •material, nonpublic information regarding
Grand Met's planned tender offer for Pillsbury stock. 171 O'Hagan was
convicted of all fifty-seven criminal counts by a jury in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota, but the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed all of the convictions.' 72 The Eighth
security delivered at a fixed price anytime prior to a specified date. See Chicago Mercantile Exch.
v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 1989). ht order to profit from the deal, die option holder
hopes that the price of the secnrity will rise above the fixed price in the contract. See id.
163 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 647.
1 °4 See id.




168 See O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 648; State v. O'llagan, 474 N.W.2d 613. 615, 623 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Brief for the United States, 1997 WI 86306, at *6, °nap'? (No. 96-842).
169 See 07lagan, 521 U.S. at 648. Along With these securities fraud violations, O'llagan was
also indicted for mail fraud, violating federal money laundering statutes, and fraudulent trading
in connection with a tender offer wider § 14(e) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14e-3. See id. at
648-49.
170 See id. at 653 11.5.
171 See Id. at 648.
172 See Id. at 649; 07-lagan II, 92 F.3d at 613.
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Circuit held that liability under § 10(b) and Rule 101)-5 could not he
based on the misappropriation theory of securities fraud. 17"
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's
rulings and upheld all fifty-seven convictions." 4 The Court held that
criminal liability under § 10(b) and Rule 101)-5 may be predicated on
the misappropriation theory, which permits imposition of liability on
anyone who trades in securities using material, nonpublic information
without disclosing such use to the source of the information, in breach
of a fiduciary duty owed to that source. 175 The Court reasoned that
O'Hagan had a duty to both his own law firm and to Grand Met to
disclose his trading activity based on nonpublic information, and his
failure to do so constituted a "deceptive device or contrivance" used .
"in connection with" the purchase or sale of secu•ities. 176 The Court
based this ruling, in large part, on its view that the Exchange Act
requires the government to prove that a person "willfully" violated Rule
lOb-5 in order to establish a criminal violation. 171 Additionally, the
Court recognized that under § 32(a), a defendant cannot be impris-
oned for violating Rule 10b-5 if that defendant proves that he or she
had no knowledge of the rule.' 78 Therefore, the Court ruled that
Congress required culpable intent on the part of a defendant charged
with criminal liability under § 10(b). 17u This requirement ensures that
criminal prosecutions brought under the misappropriation theory can
only succeed if a defendant intended to violate the law.'"
Writing for a 6-3 majority,. Justice Ginsburg first detailed the
deceptive nature of nondisclosure as it relates to the misappropria-
tion theory, stating that, "it [was O'Hagan's] failure to disclose his
personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do
so, that ma[de] his conduct 'deceptive' within the meaning of [Sec-
173 See O'llagan 11, 92 F.3(1 at 613.
111 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 652.
175 See	 al 650-52.
176 See id. at 653.
177 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811(a) (1099); Cillagan, 521 U.S. in 665-66:
17 ' See 15 U.S.C. § 78f1(a) (1999); 0 Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666.
179 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811(a) (1999); 0 Mon, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
18°See 07-lagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Spears & 	 supra note 7, at 1. Three months
after the Supreme Cow'l's decision ht 011agan, the SEC issued a consent decree, entitled In re
Christopher LaPorte and Gov't Sec. Corp. See Nu. 1262,1907 WI. 600677, 4'3 u.2 (Sept. 30, 1997).
lu applying Ilse term "willful" iii administrative proccetlings brought under § 15(b) of the
Exchange Act, the SEC stated that it would "evaluate ou a ease-by-case basis whether the respot
dent knew or reasonably should have known under the particular facts and circumstances that
his conduct was improper." See 51. This interpretation of the term "willful" iialioted that the SEC
tccognized the analylicat flâws inhetent with its previolts use of a "voluntary for
all willful violations of the Exchange Act.. See 51.; Spears & Aquilino, supra note 7, at 1.
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don] 10(13)." 1 " Turning to the requirement in § 10(b) that a trader's
deceptive use of information he "used in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of [a] security," the Court held that this element was
satisfied because the fiduciary's (O'Hagan's) fraud was consummated,
not when the fiduciary gained the confidential information, but when
he used the information to purchase or sell securities without disclos-
ing this trading to the principals (Grand Met and Dorsey & VIrhitney). 182
The Court stated that "the securities transaction and the breach of duty
thus coincide," even if the party defrauded is not the other party to
the trade, but is the source of the nonpublic information.'" The mis-
appropriation theory, the Court held, comports with the language of
§ 10(h), because it requires deception in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 184 The Court stated that this theory also achieves
one of the major goals of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securities
markets and thereby promote investor confidence.'" Comparing the
misappropriation theory to the classical theory of liability, the Court
stated that:
[C]onsidering the inhibiting impact on market participation
of trading on misappropriated information, and the congres-
sional purposes of § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a
lawyer like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law
firm representing the target of a tender offer, but not if he
works for a law firm representing the bidder. The text of the
statute requires no such result. 186
One of the niajor. arguments that O'Hagan asserted against the
validity of the misappropriation theory was that the theory itself was
too "indefinite" to permit the imposition of criminal liability. 187 Spe-
cifically, he argued that criminal convictions under the misappropria-
tion theory violate due process notions, because an uncodified "the-
ory" cannot provide adequate guidance as to what conduct is illegal.'"
181
 (Maori, 52I U.S. at 660.
t82 1d. at 656.
183 See id.; Aldave, supra note 44, at 120.
16.1 See ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
18'- See id. at 659.
186 /d. (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg was paraphrasing a 1051 decision by Judge
Learned Hand involving § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49
(2d Cir. 1051); Joel Seligman, A Mature Synthesis: 011agan Resolves "Insider" Trading's Most
Vexing Problems, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. I, 22 (1908).
187 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666; Boyce Motor Lin es, Inc. v. United States, '342 U.S. 337, '342
(1052).
j 88
 See Brief Ibr Respondent, 1097 WI. 143801, at "30-33, 011agan (No. 06-842).
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O'Hagan pointed out that it is axiomatic that "due process requires
that a criminal statute provide adequate notice to a person of ordinary
intelligence that his contemplated conduct is illegal, for 'no man shall
be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reason-
ably understand to be proscribed.'" 189 Therefore, he contended that
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 afforded him no notice that his trading in
Pillsbury stock based on nonpublic information was illegal.'"°0'Hagan
argued that:
Released from the statutory constraints which once restricted
§ 10(b)'s reach to conduct involving participants in a securi-
ties transaction, the misappropriation theory now extends the
statute to encompass any breach of fiduciary duty, the fruits
of which can be shown, however tenuously, to have 'touched'
a subsequent securities transaction,m
In response to this argument, the Court emphatically declared,
"[ARM to our decision that criminal liability may be sustained under
the misappropriation theory . . . are two sturdy safeguards Congress
has provided regarding scienter."' 92 First, to establish a criminal viola-
tion of Rule 101)-5, the government must prove that a person "willfully"
violated the provision.'" Second, a defendant may not be imprisoned
for violating Rule 101)-5 if he or she proves that he had no knowledge
of the rule.'"4 Therefore, the Court rejected O'Hagan's argument that
the misappropriation theory was too indefinite to permit the imposi-
tion of criminal liability and that the statute's "requirement of the
presence of culpable intent as a necessary element of the offense did
much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the
[statute]" in circumstances such as O'Hagan's was unjust.'•'
B. O'Hagan on Remand
Following the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the convictions
of James O'Hagan, the case was remanded back to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals to determine, in part, if O'Hagan had indeed willfully
violated § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5.'" 6 O'Hagan then argued to the Eighth
I" See id. at *;i0 (quoting Buckley v. Vale°, 424 U.S. I, 77 (1976) (per cnriam)).
199 See Brief for Respondent, 1997 WI. 143801, at *30, 071agmit (No. 96-842).
I9I Id. 91 4'31.
192 (Mogan, 521 U.N. at 665.
193 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811 .(a) (1999); (Mogan, 521 U.S. at 665.
191 See 15 U.S.C. 781E(a) (1999); 011ogan, 521 U.S. at 666.
193 ()Hagan, 521 U.S. at 666 (quoting &yr Motor Lines, 342 U.S. at 342).
I96 See Uthiled Slates v. Uliagan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter 0 Hagrin III].
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Circuit that he could not be held criminally liable because the govern-
ment had not sufficiently proved that he had "willfully" violated these
provisions as required by § 32(a).' 97 He claimed that the government
needed to establish both that he specifically knew which acts Rule
101)-5 prohibited and that he intentionally committed acts in violation
of the rule.'"
The Eighth Circuit rejected this narrow reading of Justice
Ginsburg's opinion in 0Hagan, stating "the Supreme Court was simply
explaining that the statute provides that a negligent or reckless viola-
tion of the securities laws cannot result in criminal liability; instead the
defeUdant must act willfully." 19° In dismissing O'Hagan's claim that
seemingly innocent trading activity might result in a conviction under
§ 32, the court stated that: "Criminal conviction for violation of rules
and regulations implementing § 10(b) necessarily involves fraudulent
conduct and breaches of duty by the defendant. Such acts do not
involve conduct that is often innocently undertaken." 2°°
Additionally, the court held that there is no burden on the gov-
eminent to prove that a criminal defendant actually knew that his or
her actions specifically violated Rule 10b-5. 201 The Eighth Circuit ruled
that the Supreme Court had stated simply that there is an affirmative
defense to imprisonment if a defendant proves that he or she had no
knowledge of the rule or regulation allegedly violated. 2°2 In interpret-
ing what type of intent constitutes a "willful violation" of § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the Eighth Circuit held that "'willfully' simply requires the
intentional doing of the wrongful acts—no knowledge of the rule or
regulation is required." 2"
W. ANALYSIS
This Note has shown that a mere "voluntary intent" standard for
insider trading criminal convictions cannot be supported by either the
text of the Exchange Act, the legislative intent behind that text or the
United States Supreme Court's rulings on scienter as a necessary ele-
ment of all criminal prosecutions brought under the Exchange Act. 2°4
197 See Id. at 646.
198 ,See id.
190 See id. at 647.
209 See id.
291 See 071agivi III, I19 F.3(1 at 647.
202 st., Id.
223 Id .
204 See 15 U.S.C. § 78f1(a) (1999): ()flagon, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Aaron, 446 U.S. at 601;
Ilerlalitls, supra note 54, al 147-48.
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The distinction between "voluntary" intent and actual "willful" intent
may seem somewhat trivial, but the practical effects of applying the
appropriate standard can become extremely important to those defen-
dants who stand accused of criminal insider trading violations. 20' No
longer can a defendant be found to have willfully violated any section
of the Exchange Act simply upon proof that Ile or she intentionally
committed an act which turns out to constitute a violation.mi The
difficulty that still surrounds all criminal actions under the Exchange
Act, however, is deciding what degree of scienter is required for a
comiction. 207 A defendant must act with some evil purpose to be con-
victed under § 32(a) of the Exchange Act, but how much knowledge
of the applicable laws on the part of that defendant is actually neces-
sary?208
In the criminal insider trading context, analysis of the O'Hagan
case and two hypothetical situations will illustrate that it is not neces-
sary to prove specific intent by a defendant to violate § 10(h) and Rule
10b-5. 2°9 The government is required at a minimum, however, to estab-
lish that a defendant purchased or sold securities on the basis of
material, nonpublic information and that the defendant knew that this
activity was wrongful because it involved a significant risk of violating
the federal securities laws, 21° This standard for willful violations of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 will guide both the courts and the SEC in
determining when defendants can be subjected to criminal penalties
under the Exchange Act for insider trading violations.'" Proof that a
defendant realized his or her trading was wrongful is not easily estab-
lished, but the government can rely on factors such as receipt of actual
notice regarding prohibited activity by a defendant and common trad-
ing practices within that defendant's industry. 2 ' 2
205 See Schultz, septa note 108, at 1442.
2°6 Compare Tager v. SEC, 344 F.2(1 5, 8 (2d Cir.1965) and In to New Allied 1)cv. Corp., 52
S.E.C. 1110, 1129 n.31 (1996), with 07Iagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66, and 9 'Hagan III, 139 F.3d at
646.
2°7 See Dawes, supra note 35, at 523-24.
208 See 07Iagan III, 139 F.3d at 646; United States v. Dixon, 530 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir.
1976).
26° See 07Iagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; 07Iagan III, 139 F.3d at 647.
21 ° See O'Hagan la 139 F.3d at 647; Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395; In re Christopher LaPorte &
Gov't Sec. Corp., No, 1202, 1997 WL 600677, *3 11.2 (Sept. 30, 1997).
2" See °Hagan III, 139 rad at (147; Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395; LaPorte, 1997 WI, 600677, at
*3 n.2.
212 See Aiken, supra mite 136, at 266; Carberry & Gortlon, supra note 8, at 154; Spears &
Agnilina, supra note 7, at I.
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The United States Supreme Court's holding in O'Hagan signals a
definitive end to the use of a mere "voluntary intent" standard for
criminal liability under the Exchange Act. 213 The Court placed specific
emphasis on the two "sturdy safeguards" in § 32(a) of the Exchange
Act regarding scienter, namely that a defendant must willfully violate
the statute and that defendants can avoid imprisonment if they prove
a lack of knowledge of Rule 10b-5. 214 These important statutory provi-
sions technically create a type of "ignorance of the law" excuse for
defendants accused of criminal insider trading Niolations. 213 By uphold-
ing all of the convictions in O'Hagan, however, the Court held that
James O'Hagan had, in fact, willfully violated § 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5. 216 Justice Ginsburg's statements regarding scienter
in O'Hagan demonstrate that, in order to obtain a criminal conviction
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the government must prove that the
defendant knew that he or she was committing a wrongful act at the
time of the alleged violation. 217 This requirement of culpable intent,
while serving as a basis for upholding the criminal convictions in
O'Hagan, specifically refutes the notion that a party can willfully violate
the Exchange Act by simply voluntarily undertaking an action that
constitutes a violation.218 The Court's emphasis on culpable intent also
reinforced the holdings of cases such as Dixon and Charnay, which
stressed that criminal defendants must have participated in an act that
they knew was wrongful in order to be convicted, 219 In effect, the Court
in O'Hagan recognized Jonathan Eisenberg's characterization of the
government's prior "voluntary intent" standard as holding defendants
liable for willful violations as long as they were not "insane, uncon-
scious, or sleepwalking" at the time of the alleged wrongful conduct. 22°
The Court's ruling in O'Hagan shows that this standard for criminal
convictions is no longer viable in federal court or in SEC enforcement
hearings. 22 '
The Supreme Court's O'Hagan decision also makes the standard
of intent for criminal violations of the Exchange Act consistent with
the original intent of Congress in enacting the statute. 222 In 1934,
213
	 O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66, with Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.




2 ' 7 See id.
2' Compare 07 lagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66, with Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.
210
	 United States v. Cliarnay, 537 F.2d 341, 352 (9ilt Cir. 1976); Dixon, 536 F.2d at 1395.
220
 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Eisenberg, septa note 53, at 17.
221 See O'llagarn, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Eisenberg, supra 'lute 53, at 17.
222 See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66: Herlands, supra note 54, at 147-48.
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Congress differentiated between willful and non-willful violations of
the Exchange Act. 223 In actions seeking criminal penalties, such as fines
or imprisonment, or administrative sanctions, Congress mandated that
the government would have to prove that a person willfully violated
the statute. 224 On the other hand, for those violations of the Exchange
Act that can only lead to civil injunctions or money damages, there is
no requirement of willful conduct on the part of a defendant. 225 In
reaffirming this important distinction, the Supreme Court's holding in
O'Hagan corrected the inaccurate interpretation of the Exchange Act
by the SEC and various courts over the last forty-five years. 22"
Additionally, the Court in O'Hagan pointed out that the require-
ment of culpable intent in § 32(a) provides adequate protection
against the possibility that a person could be convicted of a crime
which is not sufficiently well-defined so as to provide notice of what
type of conduct is actually prohibited. 227 In the insider trading context,
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that James O'Hagan had adequate notice
that his trading on the basis of misappropriated nonpublic inforniation
was a criminal violation of § 10(b)and Rule 1013-5, because he had
willfully breached his duties to.his law firm and its client. 22" There can
be no validity to the argument, that the crime of insider trading,
whether prosecuted under the traditional theory or the misappropria-
tion theory, is too vague and ambiguous to afford a trader with notice
of what type of activity is considered illega1. 229 In order to be convicted
under § 32(a), a trader must either know that his or her activity
specifically violates § 10(b) and Rule '1013-5 or realize that it presents a
significant risk of constituting a violation, because such knowledge
places a defendant on notice of their illegal activity. 230
Once it is established that a particular criminal insider trading
defendant acted with the realization that his or her conduct was indeed
wrongful, there is still some question as to the minimum degree of
intent necessary for a conviction. 29 ' In other words, is it necessary to
establish that a defendant specifically intended to violate the language
223 See 15 U.S.C. § 781r(a) (1999); Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 13.
221 See 15 U.S.C. § 7811(a) (1999).
See 15 U.S.C. § 7811-1(a) (I) (A) (1999),
22' 1 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781T(a), 78a-1(a) (1) (A) (1999); (Mogan, 521 U.S. al 665-66; Chorally,
537 F.2t1 at 357 (Sneed, l., concurring); Tager v, SEC, 344 F.2(1 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1965).
227 Str °flagon, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
228 see id.
229 See id.; sre also Brief Ric Respondent, 1097 W1. 143801, at "30-33, °flagon (No. 96-842).
2" See Onogan, 521 U.S. al 665-66; 0 Mtgan III, 139 F.3d at 647; Dixon, 536 F.26 at 1395.
" 1 See °flagon III, 139 F.3d at 647; Dawes, supra note 35, al 523.
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of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, or is it enough to show that the defendant
acted with a more general intent to violate these provisions?'
In his case on remand from the Supreme Court to the Eighth
Circuit, James O'Hagaty attempted to convince the court that the
government bore the burden of proving both that he knew what acts
Rule 10b-5 specifically prohibited and that he intentionally committed
such illegal acts.23" The Eighth Circuit, however, refused to apply this
strict standard of "specific intent" to § 32(a) of the Exchange Act, and
instead provided useful guidelines as to the degree of scienter needed
to sustain an insider trading conviction. 2'4
The Eighth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court's holding in
O'Hagan to mean that the requisite level of scienter to violate Rule
10b-5 lies somewhere beyond mere negligence or recklessness, but
short of specific intent. 235 The court reasoned that because § 32(a)
allows lack of knowledge of a specific rule to constitute an affirmative
defense only to imprisonment following conviction, such a lack of
knowledge cannot be considered a defense to the conviction itself. 231'
Therefore, the standard of intent for willful violations of § 10(b) and
Rule 101)-5 is merely that of a general intent to commit a wrongful
act.237 As previously stated, this general intent can be shown by proof
that a defendant acted with knowledge that the conduct was signifi-
candy likely to violate the iaW.2313 Such knowledge can be shown by any
receipt of actual notice of the applicable securities laws, the common
trading practices to which a defendant was exposed, and by evidence of
deceit, concealment or the making of false exculpatory statements."
The Eighth Circuit's holding in 0Hagan III, therefore, seems to
provide the most recent and accurate guidelines regarding the stand-
ard for willful violations of § 10(b) and Rule 101)-5. 24° The final state-
ment made by the court on this subject, however, used slightly ambigu-
ous language that could possibly lead to further confusion. 24 ' The court
stated its conclusion that "'willfully' simply requires the intentional
232
 See Oflagan III, 139 KM at 647; Dawes, supra note 35, at 523.
231 See O'llagan HI 131) F.3(1 in 640.






238 See O'Hagan III, 139 F.3d at 647; Dixon, 536 F.2ti at 1395; LaPorte, 1997 WI, 600677, at
*3 n.2.
239 See Aiken, supra note 136, at 266; Carberry (le Gordon, supra note 8, at 184; Spears &
Aquilina, supra note 7, at 1.
2
'°See ()Hagan III, 139 F.3ti at 647.
zit see id.
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doing of the wrongful acts" and cited the Second Circuit's holding in
Dixon and the Ninth Circuit's majority opinion in Charnay as prece-
dent for this statement. 242 This language is ambiguous because it could
easily be interpreted as stating that an individual can willfully violate
the Exchange Act by simply acting intentionally, without being aware
of the illegal nature of his or her activity.' 2" This type of "voluntary
intent" is not sufficient to support a criminal conviction. 244 Although it
does not appear that this erroneous standard was intended by the
Eighth Circuit's statement, the court's conclusion might be better said
as: "'willfully' requires an intent on the part of the defendant to
commit a wrongful act."245
The practical consequences of distinguishing between culpable
and non-culpable violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are extremely
important, and can be illustrated by two distinct hypothetical situations
involving criminal prosecutions of insider trading defendants. 24" In
each of the following situations, a defendant has likely violated § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5, but may or may not have acted with the requisite level
of culpable intent to be criminally convicted. 247
In the first hypothetical prosecution, the defendant is a certified
public accountant who is employed by an accounting firm that was
hired by Corporation X to audit its most recent financial statements.
While the defendant was performing work for Corporation X, she had
direct contact with several of the company's officers and managers.
Through conversations with some of these employees, the defendant
learned that Corporation X was about to become the subject of a cash
tender offer, made by Corporation Y, for all of the common stock of
Corporation X. The defendant knew that Corporation Y's stock was
trading on a national exchange for $30 per share, and that Corpora-
tion X's stock was trading for $10 per share. After hearing the news of,
the proposed tender offer, the defendant arranged to purchase 500
shares of Corporation X's common stock. Subsequently, the tender
offer was made, and Corporation X's stock price rose to $18 per share.
At this point, defendant sold her 500 shares of Corporation X stock
for a $4000 profit.
Given the limited facts of this admittedly simple hypothetical, it
appears that the defendant has violated § 10(b)and Rule 101)-5 for her
242 See id.
243 See id.
2141 See 011abran, 521 U.S. aii365-68; LaPorte, 1997	 600677, at *3 n.2,
2'' 5 Cf Wigan III, 139 F.34.1 at (147.
241 ' See Carberry & Gordoli„su pro note 8, at 170; Spears & A,luiliva, supra note 7, al 1.
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1999); 17 GER. § 240.10b-5 (1999).
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trading activity based on material, nonpublic information. 248 This de-
fendant would likely be considered to be a temporary insider of Cor-
poration X and, therefore, be prosecuted under the traditional theory
of insider trading liability. 249 Her trading was illegal because as an
insider of Corporation X, the defendant was prohibited from purchas-
ing the stock of that company on the basis of ntatetial, nonpublic
information. 25° Her knowledge regarding the proposed tender offer
placed her at an unfair advantage over the shareholders of Corpora-
tion X, who were without this critical inside information. 251 Criminal
penalties, however, could only be imposed on this defendant if she was
found to have willfully violated § 10(b) and Rule 101)-5. 252 In this case,
the burden on the government to prove culpable intent by the defen-
dant could be satisfied without much difficulty. 2" It is likely that as a
certified public accountant and knowledgeable stock trader, this defen-
dant probably knew exactly what type of activity § 10(b) and Rule 1013-5
prohibit:44 Even if specific intent to violate these provisions could not
be sufficiently established, the government would certainly be able to
show general intent to break the law on the part. of this defendant. 255
Much like the prosecution of the defendant-lawyer in ()Hagan, the
government could successfully argue that this accountant acted with
culpable intent because she knew that her trading was wrongfu1. 256 At
a minimum, her training and experience provided this defendant with
knowledge that trading on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion of this type was likely to violate the federal securities laws. 257 The
government could introduce evidence of any notice of the insider
trading laws that the defendant had received from either her profes-
sional training or from her employer. 258 Evidence of common trading
practices by other accountants with similar job qualifications and re-
248 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1999); 17 C.F.R. § 240.101-5 (1999); see also 07lagan, 521 U.S. at
652.
24•  See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. (146, (155 n.14 (1983).
252 see
 ()Mon, 521 U.S: at 652; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655; Chian ells v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 228 (1980).
251 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 652; Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
252 See 15 U.S.C. § 781f(a) (1099); 011agan, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
253 See OTIagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Antolini et al., supra note 30, at 1019; Spears &Aquilina,
supra note 7, at 1.
254 See United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. klinuse,
114 F.211 36. 39 (26 Cir. 1940); Aiken, sitkra note 136, at 236, 265.
255 See ()Viagra, 111,139 F.26 at 647.
256 See 071agan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; O'Hagan III, 139 F.26 at 647.
257
 See Weinm578 F.2t1 at 785-86; Carberry & Gordon, s 	 note 8, at 184.
258
 See C.arberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 184.
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, sponsibilities could also be used to establish the defendant's knowledge
of her wronglid conduct.'"
In a second hypothetical prosecution, the defendant is a low-level
employee of Corporation Y, who works in the mailroom. He is respon-
sible for sorting incoming and outgoing mail, and for delivering mail
to other employees while picking up their outgoing letters and pack-
ages. While riding in an elevator at work, the defendant had a friendly
conversation with two officers of Corporation Y, who both knew the
defendant as a mailroom employee. When the defendant asked these
officers how business was going, they responded by telling Minn that
Corporation Y's business was expanding more and more each day. One
officer asked the defendant if he was familiar with Corporation X, to
which the defendant replied that he had heard of that company be-
fore. "Well," said the officer, "we are seriously considering taking over
Corporation X as soon as we can." As these officers departed the
elevator, one said to the other, "Their stock price should go through
the roof after that!"
This defendant proceeded to purchase 200 shares of Corporation
X's common stock at $10 per share, from his computer at home that
night. After Corporation Y publicly announced its cash tender offer
for the stock of Corporation X, the price of Corporation X's shares
rose to $18, at which point the defendant sold his 200 shares for a
$1600 profit.
This defendant would be prosecuted for violating § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory, since he was not an
insider of Corporation X, and owed no fiduciary duties to shareholders
of that company."° Additionally, this defendant could be found liable
under the misappropriation theory, because he obtained material,
nonpublic information from his employers, and traded on the basis of
that information. 261 Assuming that a court would find that the defen-
dant owed a duty to the source of this misappropriated informa-
tion either to abstain from trading based on the information or to
disclose such intentions to trade, this defendant violated § 10(b)and
Rule 101-5. 2''"
Although this defendant. would probably be liable for civil injunc-
tions and monetary fines under the Exchange Act, the government
would probably not be able to impose criminal penalties on the defen-
239 See Minty., 578 F.2(.1 al 785-86; Min use, 114 F.2{1 at 39; Aiken, supra note 136, at 236, 265.
269 See °Mon, 521 U.S. at 653 i1.5.
26] See id.
262 See id.
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dant. 263 Based on the limited facts of the hypothetical, it does not
appear that he acted with the requisite culpable intent when trading
in the securities of Corporation X. 264
 In order to convict, the govern-
ment must prove that the defendant. knew that his activity was wrong-
ful. 266 The defendant, as a low-level mailroom employee, is not likely
to have had any knowledge regarding the types of trading activity
prohibited by § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 266 Additionally, this defendant
could successfully argue that he traded without any notion that he was
acting wrongfully. 267 If this defendant could establish that, in fact, he
was not aware of any risk of violating the federal securities laws, and
that he had no reason to know of any possible risk, he should be able
to avoid criminal conviction under § 32(a) of the Exchange Act. 268 For
example, he might raise' the "good faith" defense and claim that he
had placed his trades with the belief that lie was acting legally, and that
any resulting violation was simply the result of an innocent mistake or
negligence. 269 These facts present a good case for this defendant to
succeed on such a defense.
These two hypothetical situations demonstrate that the O'Hagan
Court's emphasis on the scienter requirements of § 32(a), will afford
defendants greater protection from criminal prosecution, provided
that the defendants lack sufficient knowledge of the federal securities
laws to realize that their trading is likely to be in violation of those
laws. 27° In a case such as °Hagan, or the first hypothetical, the govern-
ment is not faced with significant hardship in sustaining its burden to
prove that a defendant charged with criminal insider trading acted
with culpable intent. 271 In a case involving a defendant with little or no
knowledge regarding the federal securities laws, however, the govern-
ment cannot criminally convict that defendant under § 10(b) or Rule
I0b-5. 272
 The difference in treatment between those defendants with
262 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a) (1) (A) (1999): see also Spears & Aquiliiia, supra note 7, at 1.
264 See A111101111i et al.. supra note 30, at 1021; Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 184.
265 See O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 665-66; Dixon, 536 F,2d at 1396.
266 See Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 187-88.
267 See Weiner, 578 F.2c1 786-87 (bolding that for defendants charged with violating § 32 of
the Exchange Act, proof of good faith constitutes a complete defense lo the charges); An tolini
et al., supra note 30, at 1021.
226 See 15 U.S.G. 78ff(a) (1999); Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 187-88.
262 See Weiner; 578 F.2(1 786-87; Antolini ei al., supra note 121, at 1021.
2" See O'llagan, 521 U.S. at 665-661 Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 172; Spears &
Aquilino, supra now 7, at 1.
271 See 011agan, 521 U.S. at 665-66.
272 See In re Christopher LaPorte & Gov't Sec. Corp., No. 1262, 1997 IVL 600677 at *3 11.2
(Sept. 30, 1997); Carberry Gordon, supra note 8, at 189; Spears & Aquilino, supra note 7, at
1.
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knowledge of, and experience with, the federal securities laws and
those without such knowledge or experience, results directly from the
congressional choice made in 1934 to distinguish between culpable
and non-culpable violations of the Exchange Act. 273
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's holding in O'Hagan, while recognizing the
validity of the misappropriation theory of insider trading liability, also
stressed the element of culpable intent as a requirement for sustaining
any conviction under § 32(a) of the Exchange Act. This aspect of the
Court's decision, regarding scienter as a necessary element of criminal
insider trading prosecutions, ensures that the Exchange Act will be
interpreted according to Congress's original intent. That is, in order
for any investor to be subject to criminal penalties for violations of
§ 10 (b)of the Exchange Act and Rule 101)-5, that person must act with
knowledge that his or her trading is a wrongful activity. This culpable
intent can be demonstrated by proof that a trader actually knew what
activity § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit, or that the trader was aware
that his or her actions presented a significant risk of violating the
federal securities laws. No person may be criminally convicted for
insider trading violations without proof of culpable intent.
BRIAN1 CARR
273 See 1934 ilearingt, supra note 57, at 7465: Carberry & Gordon, supra note 8, at 179;
Herlands, .51111111 note 54, at 147-48.
